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Abstract
High levels of intolerance of uncertainty (IU) could contribute to abnormal decision making
in uncertain situations. Patients with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) often report
high IU, indecisiveness and the need to seek greater certainty before making decisions. The
Beads task is a commonly used task assessing the degree of information gathering prior to
making a decision and so would be predicted to show impairments in OCD patients. Results
to date have found mixed support for this, possibility due to methodological issues. Here, a
group of OCD patients (n = 50) with no comorbidities was compared with age, gender, and
verbal-IQ matched controls (n = 50) on the most commonly used version of the Beads task.
An independent sample of healthy volunteers with high versus low OC symptoms, and high
versus low IU were also assessed (n = 125). There was no evidence that patients with OCD
differed from control volunteers in the degree of information gathering prior to making a deci-
sion. Medication status and age did not appear to mediate performance. Similarly, there
were no association in healthy volunteers between task performance and OC or IU charac-
teristics. Additional measures examining the degree of certainty initially showed support for
greater uncertainty in patients, but this was due to deviations from task instructions in a sub-
set of patients. We conclude that despite the large sample size and good matching between
groups, the Beads task in its most widely used form is not a useful measure of IU or of infor-
mation gathering in OCD. The results argue against a robust behavioural difference in OCD
when compared to controls. Recommendations for future studies employing the task are
discussed.
Introduction
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), with a lifetime prevalence of 2–3%, is characterized by
recurrent intrusive thoughts, and ritualistic repetitive behaviours or mental acts [1]. The disor-
der is associated with substantial personal distress and societal costs [2]. Clinical impression of
everyday impairments in patients include severe difficulties making decisions, most typically
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characterized by indecisiveness and pathological doubt [3]. This is seen even in contexts unre-
lated to their obsessions and compulsions [4]. However, research using formalized cognitive
testing has not shown consistent evidence for decision making difficulties in OCD patients [5,
6]. One aspect of decision making that could lead to everyday impairments is high levels of
intolerance of uncertainty, whereby individuals perceive and respond abnormally in uncertain
situations [7].
High intolerance of uncertainty (IU) refers to experiencing doubt as aversive, with even
moderate uncertainty being experienced as stressful and upsetting [7, 8]. Initially developed
in relation to anxiety, it is increasingly posited as a transdiagnostic construct [9]. Notably,
patients with OCD report elevated IU, with a positive association between IU and OC traits
and behaviours [10, 11]. It may be this characteristic in OCD that is linked to indecisiveness,
being overly cautious and requiring excessive deliberation, as individuals strive to accumulate
more evidence before making decisions.
In accordance with this notion, patient performance has been investigated in tasks assessing
information gathering prior to making a decision (e.g., [12–14]). The most prominent has
been a probabilistic inference/reasoning task, known as the Beads task [15]. Participants view
two containers, each holding a mixture of two bead colours (or balls/straws). Typically each
container, or jar, contains mostly beads of one colour. Participants are asked to decide which
of the two jars has been selected (by the experimenter or computer). To do this, they can
request beads one at a time from the selected jar, until they are ready to make their choice. In
this version (Condition 1), the key outcome measure is draws to decision, which is hypothe-
sized to be greater in OCD patients. Other versions require probabilistic estimates from the
participant on each draw, this being sensitive to how participants shift their judgements of cer-
tainty. Namely, a fixed number of beads is drawn from the selected jar and after each draw,
participants estimate the relative likelihood of each jar having been selected (Condition 2).
Here it is hypothesized that OCD patients will exhibit less extreme probability estimates,
reflecting reduced certainty. They may also exhibit greater departures from an objective
observer often calculated as Bayesian normative values when compared to controls [16, 17].
These performance indices should provide objective behavioural measures of IU in OCD in a
controlled setting.
Initial evidence supported the hypothesis that OCD patients indeed require more beads
before making a decision ([15, 16, 18] see also [19]). Several subsequent studies however, failed
to support this [20, 21]. More recently, one study provided evidence for the opposite notion,
with OCD patients requesting fewer beads than controls [22]. This was interpreted as greater
impulsivity in these patients, as also evidenced by higher self-reported impulsivity (see also
[23]). These patients presumably adopted an impulsive response style, requiring less informa-
tion and even jumping to conclusions [22]. Jumping to conclusions (JTC) reasoning style,
whereby participants ask for only one or two beads before making their decisions, has been
reliably captured by the Beads task in patients with delusions and is believed to contribute to
the formation and maintenance their symptoms [24, 25]. Mixed results pertaining to OCD
performance in evidence seeking tasks is not specific to the Beads task, being reported in the
Information Sampling Task where excessive draws to decision were found in some studies but
not others [6, 13]. These latter studies raise the possibility that age may mediate draws to deci-
sion, as positive results were found in young but not older samples [26].
Closer inspection of studies employing the Beads task with OCD samples reveals a complex
picture (see also Table 1). Studies vary in sample characteristics, and sample size has often
been modest, with three of seven studies reporting on 12 or fewer patients. The presence of
comorbid disorders may contribute to the inconsistent findings, as a greater number of draws
has been associated with disorders such as bulimia nervosa [27]. Conversely, binge drinking,
Avoid jumping to conclusions under uncertainty in OCD
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970 January 15, 2020 2 / 17
Bioventrures; grants from Shionogi, Smallpharma;
royalties from Cambridge Cognition (CANTAB).
NAF reports personal fees from Otsuka, Lundbeck,
Abbott, Sun Pharma, Taylor and Francis, Elsevier;
personal fees and non-financial support from
RANZCP, Wiley; grants from NIHR, Wellcome;
grants, all outside the submitted work. All other
authors have declared that no competing interests
exist. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS
ONE policies on sharing data and materials.
schizophrenia and delusional disorders are associated with fewer draws [28, 29]. Medication
may also play a role, as indirect catecholaminergic agonist drugs, such as methylphenidate, can
alter task performance, although in ways dependent on baseline performance [30]. Moreover,
reduced draws were reported in a sample of mostly treatment refractory OCD patients receiv-
ing both serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) and antipsychotic medication, who were previ-
ously unresponsive to SSRI treatment thus suggesting drug-related effects [22]. Conversely,
positive findings were found in OCD patients who had undergone deep brain stimulation,
though this sample is not representative consisting of severe and largely treatment-resistant
patients [19].
Key experimental and procedural characteristics likely also contribute to the diversity of
findings. For example, in some studies participants requested beads directly from the experi-
menter, raising the possibility of experimenter bias [15, 16, 18, 20]. The limited availability of
information from previous draws may also have biased some results, as this can increase work-
ing memory demands and contribute to indecision. The use of different beads sequences, spec-
ifying the positions of non-majority colour beads, could also influence task sensitivity. While
some have used established sequences (e.g., [17, 31]), others have used alternative sequences or
have not specified the sequence used.
The sequence is particularly important in Condition 2. The commonly used fixed sequence
of 20 beads involves a reversal of the dominant colour mid-way, allowing researchers to inves-
tigate biases in schizophrenic patients [17]. OCD patients may have abnormalities in reversal
learning [32] and tend to be overly rigid in their response patterns [33]. It has also been sug-
gested that Condition 2 is more sensitive because it is more cognitively demanding and conse-
quently more stressful, making it more likely to capture abnormal decisional processes [15,
16]. However, here too findings are inconsistent [16, 18]. Additionally, participants in Condi-
tion 2 may not always fully understand the instructions, making their estimation on the most
Table 1. Summary of previous studies of beads task in OCD.
Study Participants Comorbidities Medication
Status
Condition 1 findingsa Condition 2 findingsb Note
Volans (1976) 8 Obsessionals;
8 HC
n/a n/a + after neuroticism
partialed out
Greater deviation from
Bayesian norm on first
draw
22 phobic patients
Fear & Healy
(1997)
26 OCD; 30 HC n/a n/a n.s. Draws 3.4 in OCD and
2.6 in HC
OCD under-confident,
less certain and
deliberated longer
22 DD; 15 OCD+DD
Pe´lissier &
O’Connor
(2002)
12 OCD; 12 HC No comorbidities n/a (+) Draws 11.0 in OCD
and 7.56 in HC. More
decision errors (+)
n.s. 10 GAD
Reese et al.
(2011)
20 OCD; 20 HC 10 with comorbidities 15 medicated n.s. OCD adjust less to
difficulty changes
n/a 20 BDD
Jacobsen et al.
(2012)
32 OCD; 16 HC No comorbid psychotic
disorders, other
comorbidities n/a
n/a n.s. Draws 4.82 in OCD
and 3.88 in HC
n/a OCD patients with high
versus low conviction; 16
with delusions
Grassi et al
(2015)
38 OCD; 39 HC No comorbidities Majority (32)
medicated
- Draws 3.76 in OCD and
7.79 in HC
n/a 27 treatment resistant
Voon et al
(2017)
12 OCD; 24 HC 2 with comorbidities All medicated + Draws 12.55 in OCD and
5.49 in HC
n/a All treatment resistant &
undergone DBS
OCD, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder; HC, healthy controls; DD, delusional disorder; DBS, deep brain stimulation; GAD, generalized anxiety disorder; BDD, body
dysmorphic disorder.
aCondition 1: procedures where participants respond by merely asking for additional beads or not.
bCondition 2: procedures where probabilistic estimations or decisions are required.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970.t001
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recent bead or forgetting to take into account that the entire sequence is drawn from one jar
[34, 35]. This miscomprehension may underlie a pattern of responding labelled over-adjusting,
believed to capture radical changes in decisions in the face of modest accumulations of discon-
firming evidence [17, 34].
These procedural considerations are also of relevance when assessing the hypothesized link
between Beads task performance and IU, regardless of OCD. Preliminary evidence indicated a
positive association between beads requested and self-reported IU in students [36]. A subse-
quent study of anxiety patients (a third of which met diagnostic criteria for OCD) and controls
did not detect behavioural differences [37]. Similarly, no associations between IU and Beads
task performance were found in community or eating disorder samples [3, 27]. An alternate
hypothesis put forward is that high trait anxiety individuals may gather less evidence before
deciding, in an effort to shorten the duration of experiencing uncertainty [38]. Though IU was
not directly assessed, those with high- compared to low-trait anxiety requested fewer beads,
seemingly indicating a JTC reasoning style, and chose the incorrect jar more often, suggesting
an implicit motivation to shorten the uncertain state even at the expense of correctness [38].
This scenario could account in part for the JTC style found in a sample of largely treatment
refractory OCD patients [22].
The present study set out to replicate one of the most commonly used procedures of the
Beads task, assessing performance in both conditions 1 and 2, in a fully computerized task
where the experimenter did not mediate responding. The patients were largely without comor-
bidities, thus ensuring we could assess the role of OCD specifically. Similarly, the large sample
size enabled us to assess the possible role of medication status. Given that OC traits occur in
the general population and are dimensional in nature [39], an additional non-clinical student
sample was investigated. OC symptoms, IU and anxiety were collected to assess their relative
associations with performance.
Methods and materials
Study 1: OCD patient and control sample
Control participants had no current or past psychiatric disorders as determined by a screening
interview including the MINI [40], and were not taking any psychoactive medications. Patients
met DSM-IV criteria for OCD with no other axis-I disorders as determined by a detailed struc-
tured clinical interview with a psychiatrist. Following testing it was ascertained that three
patients had met criteria for Generalized Anxiety Disorder and one for Anorexia Nervosa.
Inclusion of these patients did not alter the results so they were retained. Exclusion criteria
for all participants included current or past neurological disorders or brain damage. Of the 50
patients, 18 were unmedicated, 29 were prescribed SSRIs with six prescribed an adjunct anti-
psychotic. Two also received an adjunct antidepressant, one patient was prescribed pregabalin
and one lithium carbonate. The study received NRES Cambridgeshire Research Ethics Com-
mittee approval (10/H0308/27), and participants provided written informed consent, receiving
a small financial reimbursement for taking part.
Study 2: Student sample
Participants were recruited from adverts and an undergraduate participant pool. Exclusion cri-
teria included current or past diagnosed psychiatric disorder, neurological disorders or brain
damage. The study was approved by the Cambridge University Psychology Ethics Committee.
Participants provided written informed consent and received either course credit or a small
financial reimbursement.
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Procedure and materials
Participants in both samples were seated at a comfortable viewing distance and tested individ-
ually with the experimenter present. For patients, prior to testing, symptom severity was
assessed with the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (YBOCS, [41]) and depression
symptom severity was assessed with the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale
(MADRS, [42]). Participants completed the following questionnaires with Latin square coun-
terbalancing: Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (OCI, [43]), state/trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI, [44]), Barrett Impulsivity Scale (BIS, [45]) and Intolerance of Uncertainty (IU, [46]). IU
included all 27 original items, but following recent evidence supporting the 12-item two-factor
model [47, 48], scores were computed for Prospective and Inhibitory IU [49]. Twenty student
participants did not complete the IU and BIS due to experimenter error. Verbal IQ was
assessed with the National Adult Reading Test (NART, [50]). The Beck Depression Inventory,
Padua Inventory and Metacognitive Questionnaire were administered to some participants
but not analyzed [51–53]. Participants performed additional tasks not reported here.
The Beads task consisted of two conditions and was based on previous publications with
the same order of draws for Condition 1: AAABAAAAABBAAAAAAAAB, and Condition 2:
AAABAAAABABBBABBBBBAB [16, 17]. Condition 1 showed two jars with a mixture of yel-
low and black beads, one with 85% yellow and the other with 85% black beads. Images of the
jars were present in the instructions and throughout the task. The selected jar, determining
bead sequence and its location, was counterbalanced within each group. Instructions first
informed participants that they had to decide from which of the two jars the beads are drawn.
They explicitly stated that beads will be taken from the same jar for all draws; the beads will
be replaced back to the same jar after each draw and that participants could request as many
draws as they wished so as to be completely sure which jar was chosen. They were then ques-
tioned as to the chance that the first draw, from either jar would be black. If unclear, the exper-
imenter explained the instructions and clarified the question. Subsequently, the experimenter
remained present, out of line of sight throughout, and did not interfere other than to answer
questions and clarify instructions. Participants then could draw beads from the chosen jar one
at a time. After each draw two options appeared, and participants chose between ‘More beads
please’ and ‘No more beads please I’ve decided’ (Fig 1A). If more beads were requested, a bead
was added to the sequence. All draws remained on screen in the order drawn, removing any
reliance on working memory. Alternatively, buttons appeared below each jar and the partici-
pant could make their decision (Fig 1B).
Condition 2 (probabilistic estimation) presented green and pink beads, with the jars labelled
X and Y, and always followed Condition 1. Instructions were similar but stated that participants
will now see beads being drawn for them from either jar X or Y and that they had to decide
from which jar the beads were drawn. For ease of communication to the reader jar A and X
will refer to the jar corresponding to the majority of beads in the first 10 draws though in prac-
tice jar chosen and its location were counterbalanced. On each of 20 draws, the sequence to
that point appeared on the screen. After 1.5 sec, two horizontal scales appeared (labelled X and
Y, respectively) and participants had to estimate the likelihood of each jar having been selected
(Fig 1C). The scales were adjusted independently and coded on a 50 point scale [35]. The ‘next’
button allowing participants to proceed to the next draw appeared only after adjusting both
scales, which were initially midway. Two scales, rather than one, allow independence of proba-
bility estimates and no loss of information due to imposed reciprocity [35]. In both conditions
no time limits were placed on responses, the sequence of drawn beads remained on screen
throughout, and no feedback was provided. The experiment, programmed using Visual Studio,
was conducted on a 15.6” laptop with external mouse, running Windows 7.
Avoid jumping to conclusions under uncertainty in OCD
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Analyses and design
Analyses probed group differences between patients and controls. For comparability and to
facilitate descriptive statistics, similar analyses were conducted on the student sample using a
median split on total OCI score, along with correlational analyses. Given the hypothesized
importance of IU, secondary analyses employed a median split on IU. In Condition 1 of
the task, the mean number of draws to decision and jar chosen were assessed, as was mean
Fig 1. Beads task. Participants view the two jars in Condition 1, with options for requesting more beads or not. The
results of all draws to date are presented in the middle, with a bead being added after each request (panel A).
Participants’ view in Condition 1 before making their final decision between Jar A and Jar B (panel B). Example of
Condition 2 following the 6th draw, after making likelihood estimations that the beads were drawn from Jar X or Jar Y
(panel C).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970.g001
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deliberation time and JTC style, defined as requesting one or two beads. In Condition 2 of
the task, probabilities estimated for each draw were assessed as in previous studies [17, 18].
These include the following, with the number in parentheses referring to the index as pro-
vided by Fear and Healy (1997): a) Initial posterior estimate (4): The estimate of the likeli-
hood of Jar X being chosen after draw 1. The Bayesian estimate is 85%, scores below
represent under-confidence and above represent over-confidence. b) Draws to certainty (5):
The number of draws to an estimate of 100%, or if not reached, two estimates of 85%. c)
Effect of confirmatory evidence on subsequent judgement (6a): The increase in the second
from the first posterior estimate, with a positive score showing an increase in confidence fol-
lowing confirmatory evidence. d) Effect of disconfirmatory evidence on subsequent judgement
(6b): The decrease in the fourth from the third posterior estimate, calculated as posterior esti-
mate from draw 3 minus draw 4 so that a positive score indicates decreased confidence. e)
Errors in decision making, after draw 10 (7): A correct decision is taken to be a probability
greater than 85% favoring jar X. f) Draws from draw 10 to change in estimate (8): Number
of draws from draw 10 to any change, indicating the number of items to a change having
reached a decision. g) Size of first estimate change (9): Absolute difference in size of estimate
at draw 10 and first point of change. h) Final decision (10): Estimate after draw 20 of jar X
being chosen. i) Mean time taken per draw estimations (11). To assess behaviour against that
predicted by a Bayesian ideal observer, deviations between participant estimates and the
Bayesian norm were calculated for Condition 2 and subjected to an ANOVA with the factors
of group, jar and draw.
Initial inspection of the data supported the notion that some participants did not fully
apprehend the instructions in Condition 2 as has been previously reported [34]. Miscompre-
hension was defined as estimating the beads coming from jar Y where the sequence clearly
indicated jar X, which in practice entailed a lower rating for jar X than jar Y in draws 4 or 9.
This was in keeping with the findings regarding ‘extreme over adjustment’ [34]. Excluding
these participants resulted in analyses of Condition 2 being conducted on 35 patients, 40
HC and 53 and 55 participants in the low- and high-OCI groups, respectively. Group charac-
teristics of the smaller samples remained similar to the original samples (see also Table A in
S1 File).
Group comparisons were assessed using between subjects t-tests and non-parametric
Mann-Whitney when outliers or departures from normality were detected. Deviations from
the Bayesian norm were assessed with a mixed ANOVA. Secondary analyses assessed the role
of medication in patients. Group differences are reported without control for type I error to
strengthen the conclusions regarding no significant effects, with r and Cohen’s d effect sizes
reported where relevant. Pearson correlations probed associations between task performance
and self-report indices and were Bonferroni corrected for type I error.
Results
Demographic and clinical characteristics
OCD patients and control participants in Study 1 did not significantly differ in age, verbal
intelligence or gender distribution (Table 2). OCD patients had moderate symptom severity
and relatively low depression scores. Patients did not differ in motor and non-planning impul-
sivity but reported worse attention impulsivity, anxiety, and IU.
Table 3 describes the demographic and self-report characteristics of low- and high-OCI
groups in the student cohort in study 2 as determined by a median split on OCI scores
(Mdn = 12.5). The groups did not differ in age, gender or verbal intelligence, with high-OCI
participants scoring higher on self-reported anxiety, IU and most impulsivity measures.
Avoid jumping to conclusions under uncertainty in OCD
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Task Condition 1
Patients (5.24, SD = 3.29) did not differ from controls (5.96, SD = 3.90) in draws to decision
(Z = 1.00, U = 1104.5, p = 0.32, d = 0.20). There was also no significant difference in the pro-
portion in each group who chose after only one or two draws (χ2(1) = 1.10, p = 0.29; 6 patients
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of control and OCD patient group characteristics.
Controls
(n = 50)
OCD
(n = 50)
Characteristic Measure M (SD) M (SD) Z p
Gender M:F 26:24 27:23
Age Years 38.44 (14.29) 41.46 (14.31) 1.03 0.30
Verbal IQ NART 115.87 (7.43) 115.29 (5.98) 0.40 0.68
Obsessions & Compulsion YBOCS 20.49 (5.34)
Depression MADRS 7.33 (5.91)
Impulsivity- attention BIS- attention 14.44 (3.26) 17.94 (4.45) 4.37 <0.001
Impulsivity–motor BIS—motor 21.74 (3.81) 20.55 (5.12) 1.40 0.16
Impulsivity–non planning BIS–non planning 23.88 (4.92) 23.31 (6.09) 0.78 0.43
State Anxiety STAI-S 31.22 (9.69) 43.70 (12.13) 5.11 <0.001
Trait Anxiety STAI-T 35.82 (10.07) 57.70 (11.57) 7.14 <0.001
IU27 IU 54.32 (15.64) 85.00 (23.28) 6.22 <0.001
Prospective IU IU 17.14 (4.58) 24.23 (6.80) 5.24 <0.001
Inhibitory IU IU 7.96 (3.24) 14.49 (4.72) 6.32 <0.001
Obsessions & Compulsion OCI 9.80 (7.58) 33.14 (11.28) 7.77 <0.001
Note. NART: National Adult Reading Test; YBOCS: Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; MADRS: Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale; BIS: Barret
Impulsivity Scale; STAI-S: State/Trait Anxiety Inventory-State; STAI-T: State/Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait; IU: Intolerance of Uncertainty; OCI: Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory-Revised;
NART scores available for 41 controls and 42 patients. MADRS scores available for 42 patients;
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970.t002
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of Low and High OCI participants.
Low OCI
(n = 62)
High OCI
(n = 63)
Characteristic Measure M (SD) M (SD) Z p
Gender M:F 17:43 18:45
Age Years 24.08 (4.31) 23.21 (3.23) 0.9 0.35
Verbal IQ NART 114.99 (8.94) 112.47 (8.92) 1.45 0.15
Impulsivity- attention BIS- attention 15.26 (3.29) 17.81 (3.54) 3.13 0.002
Impulsivity–motor BIS—motor 21.87 (3.19) 23.41 (4.09) 1.65 0.10
Impulsivity–non planning BIS–non planning 21.56 (4.35) 23.84 (5.26) 2.06 0.04
State Anxiety STAI-S 30.66 (7.33) 39.08 (11.68) 4.26 <0.001
Trait Anxiety STAI-T 35.50 (7.63) 46.96 (12.21) 5.50 <0.001
IU27 IU 52.46 (13.72) 77.57 (20.52) 6.08 <0.001
Prospective IU IU 15.79 (4.93) 21.50 (6.09) 4.44 <0.001
Inhibitory IU IU 7.58 (3.02) 12.94 (4.50) 6.25 <0.001
Obsessions & Compulsion OCI 6.69 (3.73) 24.60 (11.23) 9.64 <0.001
Note. NART: National Adult Reading Test; YBOCS: Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; MADRS: Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale; BIS: Barret
Impulsivity Scale; STAI-S: State/Trait Anxiety Inventory-State; STAI-T: State/Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait; IU: Intolerance of Uncertainty; OCI: Obsessive Compulsive
Inventory-Revised.
BIS scores available for 39 and 32 Low and High OCI participants, respectively. IU scores available for 48 and56 Low and High OCI participants, respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970.t003
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vs. 3 controls). Nor did patients and controls differ in choosing the jar corresponding to the
first bead (χ2(1) = 0.34, p = 0.56; 96% vs. 98%, respectively). Additionally, mean deliberation
time per draw did not differ between patients and controls (t(98) = 0.86, p = 0.39, d = 0.17;
9.95 sec vs 8.73 sec, respectively). In the student cohort, high-OCI (5.62, SD = 3.34) did not
differ from low-OCI (5.03, SD = 2.04) in draws to decision (Z = 0.58, U = 1836.5, p = 0.57,
d = 0.21). JTC bias was rare, with two and one participants demonstrating this reasoning style
in the high- and low-OCI groups respectively (χ2(1) = 0.33, p = 0.57). Almost everyone in
both groups chose the jar corresponding to the first bead (χ2(1)<0.01, p = .99) with two
choosing incorrectly in each group. Finally, mean deliberation time per draw did not differ
between high- and low-OCI participants (t(123) = 0.35, p = 0.73, d = 0.06; 6.87 sec vs 6.63 sec,
respectively).
To assess support for the hypothesis that there were no group differences, Bayes factors
were computed in JASP (JASP Team, 2018). Using a two-sided Bayesian hypothesis test
(default Cauchy prior width of r = 0.707), Condition 1 results indicated moderate support
for the null hypothesis when taken separately, BF01 = 2.78 and BF01 = 3.05 for Studies 1 and 2
respectively. The posterior median was 0.18 and a 95% credible interval from -0.19 to 0.55 for
Study 1 and posterior median of -0.19 and a 95% credible interval of -0.53 to 0.16 for Study 2.
The use of the “Oosterwijk prior” also did not provide support for the alternative hypothesis in
either study.
Task Condition 2
Group comparisons indicated that patients and controls were similar in performance with no
significant differences on any outcome measure (see Table 4). In the student sample, contrast-
ing low- and high-OCI participants showed similar results with no significant differences. An
exception to this was the size of the first estimate change after draw 10, though given the over-
all findings and lack of type I error correction, this was taken to be a type I error. Results from
the full cohorts are presented in the SI (see Table B in S1 File).
Fig 2 shows the mean probabilities estimated for each draw of Condition 2 by group for
each jar, together with Bayesian normative values. The latter demonstrates a rise to certainty
for jar X within two draws, remaining high until draw 16 before settling on 50% for both jars,
in accordance with the final tally of beads. Both patients and controls follow this pattern, but
Table 4. Dependent variables and p values for task Condition 2.
Study 1 Study 2
Controls (n = 40) OCD (n = 35) p Low OCI (n = 53) High OCI (n = 55) p
Initial posterior estimate (4) 69.35 (17.01) 73.31 (16.27) .31 76.94 (12.35) 73.64 (16.39) .24
Number of draws to certainty (5)�� 6.43 (4.28) 5.50 (2.33) .29 4.96 (2.25) 5.64 (3.54) .25
Confirmatory effect (6a) 8.05 (11.58) 5.20 (15.84) .37 8.83 (7.94) 6.58 (11.34) .24
Disconfirmatory effect (6b) 1.60 (10.72) -0.29 (15.16) .53 3.17 (4.63) 1.60 (15.69) .49
Percent errors at draw ten (7)� 10.00% 17.14% .36 3.77% 10.91% .16
Number of draws from ten to change (8) 2.59 (2.38) 1.88 (1.65) .11 2.22 (1.54) 2.56 (1.87) .16
Size of first estimate change (9) 12.16 (19.49) 7.94 (10.72) .28 5.16 (7.76) 11.42 (19.36) <.01
Percent final decision Jar X (10)� 77.50% 82.86% .57 83.02% 81.81% .87
Mean time in seconds per draw decision (11) 12.45 (3.76) 14.27 (8.17) .21 11.57 (5.30) 10.84 (3.05) .38
Note.
�Percentage of participants, p denoting Chi-squared test;
��Sample size for this measure were 37 and 30 for controls and patients, respectively; 51 and 50 for low- and high-OCI participants, respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970.t004
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show decreased certainty for both jars compared to the Bayesian normative values. Impor-
tantly, there is little evidence for group differences (Fig 2a). Similarly, there was no evidence
for differences between low- and high-OCI participants in their likelihood estimations
(Fig 2b).
Fig 2. Mean probabilities estimated for each draw of Condition 2 by group for each jar, together with the Bayesian normative
values. Fig 2a depicts values for OCD and control groups. Fig 2b depicts values for low-OCI and high-OCI groups.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0225970.g002
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An ANOVA on patients and controls in Study 1 assessing mean deviation from the
Bayesian norm for each draw by group and jar indicated no effect for group (F(1,73) = 0.73,
p = .39), nor did group enter into any interactions (p’s>.32). There was a main effect for
jar such that the deviations were greater for jar Y (13.14) compared to jar X overall (10.51),
(F(1,73) = 9.26, p = .003). Additionally, deviations from the norm varied with draw number
(F(19,1387) = 32.99, p<.001), largely demonstrating under-confidence throughout, which
gradually reduced towards draw 10 before rising again, but also over-confidence in draws
18 and 20. The equivalent ANOVA on the student sample in Study 2 revealed marginal
effects for group (F(1,106) = 3.66, p = .058), such that deviations from the Bayesian norm
were larger for the high-OCI (10.60) compared to the low-OCI group (7.08). There was also
a marginal effect for jar (F(1,106) = 2.99, p = .086) with greater deviations for jar Y (9.06)
compared to jar X overall (8.62). Deviations over draws followed a pattern similar to that
seen in patients and controls (F(19,2014) = 36.86, p<.001). No other effect was significant
(p’s>.41).
Of note, analyses including all participants from Study 1, regardless of evidence supporting
misapprehension of the instructions, indicated that the OCD patient group showed a greater
departure compared to controls from Bayesian normative values for both jars. This was partic-
ularly apparent for the draws involving beads from jar Y and from draw 10 onwards (see SI).
This pattern was not evidenced when analyzing all participants in Study 2.
Correlation analysis
Correlations explored possible associations between task performance and demographic, clini-
cal or questionnaire variables. Associations were visually inspected for non-linear relationships
and outliers. Number of draws did not correlate with any variables in either sample, nor within
the patient group (all r values<|.1|). Mean deliberation time demonstrated weak positive asso-
ciations in Study 1 (both patients and HC) with age (r(98) = 0.21, p = .033), IU (prospective
IU: r(98) = 0.26, p = .010; inhibitory IU, r(98) = 0.21, p = .042) and trait anxiety (r(98) = 0.20,
p = .044). These associations were also present in the patients alone (r(48) = 0.31, p = .030,
r(48) = 0.46, p = .001 and r(48) = 0.32, p = .028, r(48) = 0.40, p = .004, for age, prospective IU,
inhibitory IU, and trait anxiety, respectively). In the patient sample, similar positive associa-
tions were noted for YBOCS (r(48) = 0.39, p = .006), and OCI (r(48) = 0.33, p = .021). With
Bonferroni corrections, only associations between mean deliberation time and prospective IU,
trait anxiety and YBOCS remained significant. In the student cohort there was only a weak
association with age (r(122) = 0.18, p = .042).
Secondary analyses
We explored the role of medication by contrasting medicated (n = 32) and unmedicated
patients (n = 18) with their respective control groups, which were matched for age, gender and
verbal IQ. The analyses for Condition 2 (excluding participants as detailed above) retained 20
and 15 patients in the medicated and unmedicated groups, respectively. No significant differ-
ences in performance were noted for any comparison in either Condition 1 or 2. The two
patient groups differed in age (t(48) = 2.75, p = .008), with medicated (45.38, SD = 13.72)
being older than unmedicated patients (34.50, SD = 12.91). Additionally, medicated patients
scored higher on the BIS inattention subscale (t(48) = 2.72, p = .009). Given the hypothesized
role of IU, we analysed student task performance in Study 2, this time using a median split on
total IU rather than OC symptoms. This did not reveal significant differences, replicating the
results from the analyses for both conditions reported above.
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Discussion
Given the potential utility for an objective performance index for IU in OCD, this study set
out to replicate one of the most commonly used procedures of the Beads task, assessing perfor-
mance in both Conditions 1 and 2. We took care to address concerns regarding potential task-
related confounds, including experimenter bias, working memory load, and miscomprehen-
sion. Patients were largely without comorbidities ensuring we could assess the specific role of
OCD, and sample size allowed for secondary evaluation of the role of medication status. The
results indicated no evidence for OC symptoms or IU playing a role in performance in one
of the most commonly employed versions of the task. Despite clear group differences in self-
reported traits, findings did not support the notion that patients required increased evidence
before making their decision. A second sample of 125 individuals, capitalizing on the dimen-
sional nature of these traits [39], revealed similar findings, with no association between OC or
IU traits and beads performance. Together, the results support the conclusion that the Beads
task, at least in its present configuration is insensitive to both indecisiveness as manifested in
OCD, and to IU.
There was a weak positive association between mean deliberation time and IU and anxiety.
This was evident particularly in patients, where those with worse OC symptoms required lon-
ger to decide whether to request more information. This tendency is consistent with the clini-
cal impression of patients being cautious and hesitant, requiring lengthy amounts of time to
make decisions in everyday life [4, 16]. Notably though, this was not found in the group com-
parison or in the healthy volunteer cohort. Deliberation time in decision making tasks is not
routinely reported in OCD studies, although some have reported patients being slower under
specific conditions [4, 12, 54]. Moreover, greater deliberation times can be found in OCD on a
host of cognitive tasks, limiting any interpretation of such findings [55]. Importantly, although
longer decision time is characteristic of indecisiveness, indecision goes beyond not making
timely decisions [56]. Future studies may explore conditions when deliberation times under
uncertainty might be linked to more direct behavioural measures of seeking certainty.
The results of the present samples show that patients, those characterized by high OC traits
or high IU can make decisions under some circumstances without resorting to greater infor-
mation gathering. Taken together with previous findings, it can be concluded that the Beads
task, in its present format, is not a sensitive behavioural measure of IU in the general popula-
tion [see also 3, 37]. It remains to be seen whether different adaptations of the task may be
more sensitive, as IU was found to predict information gathering in a study comparing small
samples of low and high compulsive individuals [26]. Inspection of results from this informa-
tion gathering task suggested age may a moderating factor, at least in patients as no group dif-
ferences were noted in an older sample [6, 13]. It is possible that over prolonged time, patients
could increasingly forgo strategies to gather more information, thus reducing the sensitivity
of such behavioural tasks. Present results however do not support this, as age did not correlate
with information gathering indices.
Initial positive results in Condition 2 closely replicated previous findings, seemingly indi-
cating less certainty in OCD patients [16]. However, we noted that evidence has emerged
from studies employing the Beads task in schizophrenia revealing that some patients and to a
lesser degree healthy volunteers miscomprehend instructions and do not perform the task as
intended, particularly in Condition 2 [34]. Specifically, participants change their rating dra-
matically given a single bead of one colour after a long run in another. This marked over-
adjustment appears tightly linked to miscomprehension [34]. When participants in the present
samples who showed such evidence of miscomprehension were removed, the group differ-
ences between OCD patients and controls disappeared. This strongly suggests that previous
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positive findings in Condition 2 could have resulted from miscomprehension, particularly
given our attempt to replicate and improve previous methodology. The evidence for miscom-
prehension in a subset of patients could be construed as a limitation of the current study, but
does not detract from the main conclusion given that there were no substantial differences in
information gathering performance in Condition 1 and in the sizeable remaining cohort in
Condition 2. The finding does also emphasize the importance of assessing comprehension of
the task. This does not appear to have been consistently considered in past studies on OCD.
While some have stressed the importance of understanding the task [22], it is not clear how
this was implemented. At least one study reported that some subjects dropped out because
they found the task difficult to understand [16]. Careful task setup and stimulus presentation,
training, testing for comprehension and inspection of the results should all be used routinely
in future studies to address this concern.
OCD patients here, despite being largely free of any comorbidities, had significantly higher
BIS attention-related impulsivity, consistent with previous findings [22, 23, 57]. Nevertheless,
there was no evidence of a JTC reasoning style, or any association between impulsivity and
task performance. Closer inspection of the items purported to capture attention impulsivity
clearly indicates that individuals experiencing OC and anxiety symptoms would be expected
to score high on many of them (e.g., ‘I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking’, ‘I have
racing thoughts’, ‘I concentrate easily’) raising doubts about the discriminative validity of this
subscale. In any case, ADHD patients, who are impulsive, do not show a JTC style or perfor-
mance differences in the Beads task [58], further indicating that the task is not sensitive to
decisional impulsivity. At the same time these results also clearly challenge the notion that
those with high anxiety may shorten the duration of uncertainty [38], with no clear association
between anxiety and performance noted.
The present study set out to replicate the most commonly used beads configuration, using
only the 85:15 bead ratio. This may limit the generalizability of the results, though beads ratio
did not previously seem to influence the task sensitivity to group differences [21, 37]. Similarly,
the procedure was chosen to resemble most previous studies in an effort to bring clarity to the lit-
erature. While changing affective and motivational factors may increase its sensitivity, the initial
appeal of the task was that it controlled for these factors, aiming to capture the difficulties OCD
patients report in neutral contexts [17]. The study also did not include a comparison group of
patients such as with anxiety disorders. However, the presence of such a group would not have
altered the conclusion that the task is insensitive to high levels of OC symptoms and IU.
In sum, the results do not support the notion that patients with OCD seek additional infor-
mation in the Beads task, nor that they adopt a JTC style. The results further indicate that the
task should not be considered as a behavioural index of IU. Alternative approaches may be bet-
ter pursued, such as with tasks assessing information gathering or certainty seeking behaviours
where preliminary evidence supports some associations with OC and IU self-report measures
[13, 54, 59]. Information gathering tasks typically consist of multiple trials and allow partici-
pants to gather as much information as they wish on each trial before making a decision or
even allowing them to go back and gain additional information after making their decision
[13, 54]. Certainty seeking tasks assess the extent participants will try to minimize ongoing
states of uncertainty [59]. Such tasks can offer more fine-grained and potentially more sensi-
tive measures whilst participants are under a more prolonged state of uncertainty.
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